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ResearchNote
ALL BUT ONE: SOLO DISSENTS ON
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA©
CHRISTINE M. JOSEPH*
It can be argued that the exercise of solo dissent on the
Supreme Court of Canada is judicial disagreement at
its apex-a single judge sitting on the highest court in
the nation breaking away from his or her colleagues
who have purportedly "gotten it wrong." By examining
the practice of solo dissent in the Supreme Court of
Canada over the last three decades, this research note
provides insight into this unique form of judicial
disagreement. Through construction of a typology of
solo dissents, and by providing answers to important
questions, such as how often judges render solo
dissents and whether some judges are more likely to
dissent on their own, this note unveils some of the
mystery behind decisions of the court embodying "all
but one."

On peut arguer que l'exercice de la dissension solitaire
A la Cour Supreme du Canada repr6sente le summum
do d6saccord judiciaire-un scul juge si6geant dans la
plus haute instance juridique de la nation se
d6solidarise de ses collgues, qui font pr6tendument
"fausse route." En analysant la pratique de la
dissension solitaire a la Cour Supr6me du Canada de
ces trois derni~res d6cennies, cet article permet de
creuser cette forme exceptionnelle de d6saccord
judiciaire. A travers la construction d'une typologie des
dissensions solitaires, et en r6pondant aux questions
quelle fr6quence les juges cheminentimportantesils seuls, est-ce que tous les juges participent A la
pratique de la m~me manire--cet article perce un
peu le myst~re des d6cisions de la Cour qui trahissent
le principe d'unanimit6.
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In 133 instances in the recent history of the Supreme Court of
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colleagues, publicly stating that the court "got it wrong." Surprisingly,
this phenomenon has yet to be examined. Although much research has
focused on the broader concept of judicial disagreement, none has
examined the phenomenon of the lone dissenting judge, the "outlier."'
This research note will unveil some of the mystery behind solo dissent2
by systematically analyzing the nature and the extent of this
phenomenon over three decades. By categorizing the various forms of
solo dissents and by examining the evolving nature of the outlier, this
analysis provides a meaningful foundation for future research in this
area and will offer insight into the evolving role of the Supreme Court of
Canada.
I will begin by discussing the focus and nature of the research,
and by presenting the categories of solo dissent. I will then proceed to
examine the practice of solo dissent: first, within the broader framework
of the Court as a whole and, second, in terms of the solo dissenting
practices of individual judges. Finally, I will briefly look at the more
recent practice of solo dissent in the Supreme Court of Canada.
I.

RESEARCH FOCUS

This research involved the systematic examination of solo
dissents in the Supreme Court of Canada over three decades, from the
first term of the Laskin Court in 1974 to the 2003 term of the McLachlin
Court. 3 This thirty-year span witnessed 133 solo dissents. On average, in
about five decisions each year, judges speaking alone declared that their
colleagues had arrived at the wrong conclusions. This type of
disagreement is not routine, but that it happens at all is enough to raise
the question of why solo dissents occur.
I collected and analyzed data for each Supreme Court decision
that involved a solo dissent. I focused on a number of factors, including
the length of the written opinion, panel size, category of law, term of
chief justice, appellate court composition, and lower court rulings. I also

' Peter McCormick, "Blocs, Swarms and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the
Modern Supreme Court of Canada" (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 99.
-'This note looks at only one of two forms of judicial disagreement: dissent. An important
avenue of further research will be to analyze solo separate concurrences.
- The appointment of Bora Laskin to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada on
December 27, 1973, is considered pivotal in the emergence of the modern Court. See McCormick,
supra note 1.
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examined a number of factors relating to the dissenting practices of the
individual judges: frequency, length, dissent type, and impact of previous
judicial and academic experience. Based on careful consideration of the
content and form of each opinion, I constructed a typology of solo
dissent. This categorization takes an important step toward unravelling
the mystery surrounding the practice of solo dissent. By identifying a
number of significant features, I was able to make some observations
about the writing of solo dissent opinions over the last thirty years. Even
more important, the typology will allow other researchers to compare
the 'decision-making practices of the Supreme Court of Canada with
those of other national high courts.
II.

CATEGORIES OF SOLO DISSENT

There are essentially three major types of solo dissent: freestanding dissent, limited dissent, and adoptive dissent. These categories
are classified according to their content and form. In examining the text
of each solo dissent, I looked for particular phrases and key words that
pointed to the dissent's general goal.
Free-standing dissents are the masterpieces of disagreement.
They are extensive, reasoned legal arguments which, in the words of
Charles Evans Hughes, are "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law,
to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to
have been betrayed."4 These dissents are typically written in a fashion
similar to majority opinions. They include significant background
information, facts, analysis of lower-court judgments, examination of
legislation and case law, and extensive legal analysis. In form, these solo
opinions so closely resemble majority reasons that if the reader was
unaware of the outcome of a particular case, given only the reasons of
the free-standing dissent, he or she might assume it was the decision.
As a category, free-standing dissents can be divided into two
distinct forms of reasons. A number of the free-standing dissents
examined in this study functioned as a template for the majority
decisions, and certain aspects of these dissents were adopted by the

Robert Post, "The Supreme Court Opinions as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court" (2001) 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267 at 1353.
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majority of the Court. In Winters v. Legal Services Socieo,5 for example,
Justice Binnie adopted the dissenting reasons of Justice Cory for one of
the two orders sought by the appellant. However, the majority judgment
went on to dispose of the second order with an independent set of
reasons. In other words, the majority judgment essentially stated, "for
the correct legal reasoning of issue A, refer to dissenting judge's
reasons, but in regard to issue B, refer to the reasons below."6
In contrast, the second form of free-standing dissent provides a
wholly independent set of reasons which, arguably, is intended to be
read on its own. These dissents constitute principal advocacy
documents.' On average, they are lengthy (8,138 words), and they aim to
attract future judicial votes by clarifying the current jurisprudence. For
example, in A.G. Alberta v. Putnam, Justice Dickson (as he then was)
wrote: "[T]he present case provides an opportunity to give a more
precise definition" of "what is the scope and meaning of the phrase
'Administration of Justice in the Province."' 8 Similarly, Justice Cory's
9,400 word dissent in Canada(A. G.) v. PSAC 9 contains an examination
of legal approaches taken by the United Kingdom and the United
States, and provides a comprehensive comparison of those approaches
to the development of Canadian jurisprudence. As a final example,
Justice L'Heureux-Dub&'s lengthy dissent (10,628 words) on the effects
of discrimination on gay and lesbian youth in TWU v. College of
Teachers is a passionate rejoinder to the emerging challenges of
modern society.
Limited dissent, focusing on a specific point of divergence from
the majority reasons, is the second category of solo dissent. Because of
their specific purpose, these dissents are generally shorter than freestanding dissents; they neither read like majority judgments nor provide
a template for any of the majority reasons. Limited dissents concentrate

5[1999] 3 S.C.R. 160.
6 For another example of this form of free-standing dissent, see Theriault v. The Queen,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 336.

' For more on dissents and judicial advocacy, see Tonja Jacobi, "The Judicial Signalling
Game: How Judges Strategically Shape Their Dockets" (Paper presented to the American Political
Science Association Conference, Philadelphia, 2003) [unpublished] [on file with author].
8[1981] 2 S.C.R. 267 at 279.
9[1991] 1 S.C.R. 614.
'0 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772.
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on a particular avenue of disagreement and take on a variety of forms.
In some respects, they form the catch-all category of solo dissents. If a
dissent cannot be classified as a free-standing or an adoptive dissent it
may be placed in this middle category. For example, in R. v. Dunn'1
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's dissent focused on the statutory
interpretation of the word "adjudge." Other examples include solo
dissents that focus
on overruling established precedents12 and lower
13
court decisions.
Adoptive dissents-the brief, content-free analyses which
reiterate the reasons from the lower court-comprise the third major
category of solo dissents. For example, Justice Judson stated simply in
Powell v. Cockburn, "I would dismiss the appeal and adopt the reasons
delivered by the Court of Appeal for its reversal of the judgment at
trial." 14 A number of adoptive dissents are rendered orally, 5 and usually
in the following format: "I ([Judge X]) would allow the appeal
substantially for the reasons given by Judge Y in the [province] Court of
Appeal." In some instances, a brief comment about the solo dissent is
included in the announcement of the oral decision. In R. v. Levasseur,
for example, Chief Justice Lamer provided the following explanation:
A majority of us would allow the appeal for the reasons given by Fish J.A. of the Quebec
Court of Appeal. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal,
being of the view that the judge's charge to the jury did not contain any error such as
16
would deprive the appellant of a fair and equitable trial.

A.

Results: Looking at the Court as a Whole

In the last three decades, the Supreme Court of Canada has
handed down 133 decisions with a lone dissenter. Apart from a slight
decrease during the Dickson Court, the percentage of solo dissents
gradually increased throughout this period.

11[199511

S.C.R. 227.

'2 See Justice Ritchie's dissent in The Queen v.Ancio, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225.
"See Justice Deschamps' dissent in R. v. Wu,[2003] 3 S.C.R. 530.
14[1977] 2 S.C.R. 218 at 237.
'Eleven out of 22 (50 per cent) of adoptive dissents were handed down in oral format.
16[199413 S.C.R. 518 at 518.
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Table 1: Solo Dissents as a Percentage of the Modem Supreme Court Caseload
Court

Solo Dissents

Total Caseload

Solo Dissent Rate

Laskin
Dickson

42
18

1101
660

3.8%
2.7%

Lamer

53

959

5.5%

McLachlin
Total

20
133

318
3038

6.3%
4.4%

It is apparent from Table 1 that solo dissents in the Supreme
Court of Canada-instances when one judge criticizes his or her
colleagues -is rising. Interestingly, the data indicate that there appears
to be no correlation between rates of overall disagreement within the
Court and solo dissents. The McLachlin Court, for example, has the
highest percentage of solo dissents (6.3 per cent), but the lowest
disagreement rate (34 per cent). The Dickson Court, on the contrary,
has the lowest incidence of solo dissents (2.7 per cent), but the second
highest disagreement rate (35.5 per cent). If judges are writing solo
dissents more frequently, and this cannot be attributed to a general
increase in disagreement, then what is causing this trend?
A closer look at the lone dissents provides insight into the
phenomenon. Which categories of solo dissent are being published the
most often? Which judges write them? Do they include expressions of
great respect or are they unapologetic in nature?
Table 2: Breakdown of the Frequency of the Categories of Solo Dissent
Court
Laskin
Dickson

Lamer
McLachlin
Total

Sample
1

i

Adoptive

42
18

5
2

53
20

12
3

133

22

j

1

Limited

11.9%
11.1%

17
7

22.6%
15.0%

26
11

I

16.5%

61

i

40.5%
138.9%

Free-Standing
20
9

47.6%
50.0%

49.1%
55.0%

15
6

j
1

28.3%
30.0%

45.9%

50

!

37.6%

As illustrated by Table 2, above, patterns of solo dissent vary
widely between the terms of the chief justices. During the chief
justiceships of Laskin and Dickson, nearly half of the solo dissents
written were free-standing dissents. Under the Lamer and McLachlin
administrations, however, this number dropped to less than a third of
the total solo dissent caseload, and solo dissenting judges primarily
wrote limited dissents (55 per cent).
This departure from the free-standing dissent may reflect a
reaction to the increasing volume of solo dissents for the Lamer and
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McLachlin Courts. When a judge takes on the task of writing a solo
opinion, it is often in addition to an already taxing workload. 7 Judges,
finding themselves burdened with writing an additional opinion, may be
inclined to focus on a specific point of disagreement.
Examining the average length of solo opinions supports the
assumption that an onerous workload may be a factor in the evolution of
solo dissents. Table 3, below, shows a breakdown of the average length
of solo dissents for each of the chief justiceships. Over time, Supreme
Court judges have written a smaller number of solo dissents, which, at
the same time, are greater in length. Free-standing and limited dissents
in the McLachlin Court are, on average, 46 per cent longer than those
prepared in the Laskin Court. This represents a significant increase in
length over three decades; Supreme Court judges are not only writing
solo dissents more frequently, they are spending more time and energy
doing so.
Table 3: Average Word Length of each Category of Solo Dissent
Court
Laskin
Dickson
Lamer

McLachlin
Average

Adoptive
181
169
106
17
117

words
words
words
words
words

Limited
1823 words
2158 words
3054 words
3413 words
2673 words

Free-Standing
4634
7863
7219
8698

words
words
words
words

6478 words

The increase in length of solo dissents is likely a response to the
increasing complexity and divisiveness of modern legal issues. At one
time, it was argued that judges "simply identify the facts of the case and
then simply apply the law, which directs a particular outcome. 1 8 Now,
however, we accept that there is often more than one answer to the
issues which come before the Court. Judges are no longer neutral
decision makers, but must often decide complex legal issues balanced
within a "context of broader circumstances,"' 9 including political and
social considerations. Increasingly complex decisions require judges to

"Gregory A. Calderia & Christopher J.W. Zorn, "Of Time and Consensual Norms in the
Supreme Court" (1998) 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 874.
" Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, "Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking" (2001) 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1437 at 1439.
9

See McCormick, supra note I at 106.
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devote increasing amounts of time and energy to formulate their legal
arguments.
Another potential factor contributing to the increase in length of
solo reasons is the corresponding increase in length of the majority
reasons. If solo reasons must compete with the majority reasons in order
to win over future judges and scholars, then it follows that solo reasons
will increase in length over time to correspond with their majority
counterparts.
Table 4: Comparison of Average Length of Solo Dissent and Majority Judgment
Court

Solo Dissent

Laskin
Dickson
Lamer
McLachlin

2961 words
4789 words
3662 words
4489 words

Majority Judgment
3236
4553
7575
7033

words
words
words
words

Comparison
-8.5%
+5.2%
-51.7%
-36.2%

As the data from Table 4 indicate, the length of majority
opinions has generally increased. The length of majority opinions under
the McLachlin Court is more than double the length of majority
opinions published by the Laskin Court. Although solo dissents have
also lengthened on average, the gap between the length of solo dissent
opinions and majority opinions is widening. Under Laskin and Dickson's
chief justiceships, the length of solo dissents was almost equivalent to
the length of the majority reasons: 8.5 per cent shorter for the Laskin
Court and 5.2 per cent longer for the Dickson Court. More recently,
however, solo dissent opinions are significantly shorter in comparison to
those of the majority: 51.7 per cent shorter for the Lamer Court and
36.2 per cent shorter for the McLachlin Court. This widening of the gap
is likely due to the relative decrease in the frequency of free-standing
dissents.
Interestingly, a number of solo dissents are longer than the
-majority reasons provided by the Court. Table 5, below, delineates the
solo dissents that are shorter, equal to, or longer than majority reasons
for each Court. If the solo opinion was within five hundred words of a
majority opinion (plus or minus five hundred words) I considered it
"equal." For the Laskin and Dickson Courts, over a third of the solo
dissents were longer than the majority reasons. For the Lamer and
McLachlin Courts, however, this percentage dropped to less than a
quarter.

Solo Dissents
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Table 5: Comparison of Length of Solo Dissent to Length of Majority Judgment
Court

Sample

Shorter

Laskin

42

19

Dickson
Lamer
McLachlin 1
Total

18

7

53

20
133

*

Equal*

Longer

45.8%

8

15

35.7%

38.9%

4

22.2%

7

38.9%

-29

54.7%

11

20.8%

13

11
66

55.0%

5
28

25.0%
21.1%

4
ft39

I

149.6%

I

24.5%

j
1

20.0%
29.3%

+ or - 500 words

Throughout this research, I encountered a number of perplexing
discrepancies between the length of majority opinions and solo dissents.
There were instances when the reasons of the solo dissent constituted
only a few sentences, against majority reasons which were lengthy, and
vice versa. In Laferrire v. Lawson, 2° for example, Justice LaForest
offered a 77-word solo dissent alongside the majority's 23,663-word
opinion. In R. v. Duguay,2' on the other hand, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
prepared a 14,241-word free-standing dissent, while a six-judge majority
endorsed a 167-word opinion. At the outset of her reasons, Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 noted that "the circumstances of the case are of prime
importance. 2 2 Although the reasons for these discrepancies are
speculative, it is safe to conclude that divergences of this kind denote
obvious areas of uncertainty in the law.
The chief justice's ability as a leader is another factor that could
influence the incidence of solo dissent. David Danelski's work on court
leadership on the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that high levels of
consensus are largely due to effective task and social leadership on the
part of the chief justice. 23 Due to the collegial challenges that solo
dissent presents, it seems likely that a relationship between the
disagreement rates of the chief justices and their respective Courts
would exist. Where a chief justice authored a number of solo dissents, I
expected to find that other judges would feel comfortable doing so as
well, thus resulting in a somewhat higher percentage of solo opinions.
My "follow the leader" theory, as illustrated in Table 6, did not hold

2[1991] 1 S.C.R. 541.
21[1989] 1 S.C.R. 93.

22[1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 at 98.
' See David J. Danelski, "The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process" in
Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett, eds., Courts, Judges and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York:
Random House, 1974) 525.
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true in all instances. While it seems to apply to the Dickson and Lamer
Courts, the converse is true for the Courts led by Chief Justices Laskin
and McLachlin.
Table 6: Comparison of the Rate of Solo Dissents of Chief Justices
Court

Minority Opinion

Solo Dissent

Solo Dissent Rate

Laskin
Dickson

11.1%
5.5%

1.05%
0.00%

3.8%
2.7%

Lamer

10.6%

0.53%

5.5%

3.1%

0.00%

6.3%

McLachlin

Though Chief Justices Dickson and McLachlin have both
refrained from writing solo dissents, the corresponding rates of solo
dissent of the two Courts are very different. Although the percentage of
solo dissent on the Dickson Court is low (the lowest at 2.7 per cent), the
McLachlin Court has the highest solo dissent rate (6.3 per cent) of the
four modern Courts. Chief Justice Laskin, on the other hand, wrote the
greatest number of solo dissents during his time as chief justice, yet the
incidence of solo dissents for the Court under his tutelage is one of the
lowest (3.8 per cent). With the relationship between the solo dissenting
habits of chief justices and the behaviour of the rest of the judges being
inconclusive, I decided to revisit my theory regarding leadership of the
chief justice.
The first column of Table 6, above, lists the percentage of
minority opinions composed by each chief justice. I anticipated a
relationship between the frequency of chief justice minority opinions
and the rate of solo dissent for each Court. If a chief justice refrained
from writing solo dissents, but frequently authored minority opinions, I
predicted that other judges on the Court might be more prone to author
solo opinions. The above data reveals, however, that this is not always
the case. While Chief Justice McLachlin engaged in the practice of
minority writing least frequently (3.1 per cent of the time), the average
rate of solo dissent on the McLachlin Court is the highest of the four. In
contrast, although Chief Justice Laskin authored minority opinions 11.1
per cent of the time, this did not yield a higher rate of solo dissent for
the rest of his colleagues. It is clear that Supreme Court judges tend to
engage in the writing of solo dissents independently of the practices of
the chief justice.
My analysis of solo dissent also included a delineation of the
Court's caseload. I divided the cases dealt with by the Court that yielded
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a solo dissent into the following three categories: criminal, private, and
public.".
Table 7: Breakdown of the Supreme Court Caseload Involving Solo Dissents
Court

Sample

1

Laskin

Criminal

Public

42

10

23

1 54.8%

9

1 21.4%

Dickson

18

7

38.9%

4

22.2%

7

38.9%

Lamer
McLachlin 1

53
20

28
12

52.8%
60.0%

12
2

22.7%
10.0%

13
6

24.5%
30.0%

Total

133

57

42.9%

41

30.8%

35

26.3%

1

123.8%

Private

i

Table 7 shows that the trend in the shift of the composition of
these appeals is striking. Under Chief Justice Laskin, private law appeals
made up more than half of the solo dissent appeals (54.8 per cent),
while criminal appeals counted for less than a quarter (23.8 per cent).
Over time, this characterization has changed dramatically. Now, cases
containing a heavy criminal law component comprise more than 50 per
cent of the Court's outlier caseload; the focus on private law has
dramatically decreased. While this pattern is representative of an overall
shift in caseload, 2 this indicates that Supreme Court judges are often at
odds with their colleagues over appeals of a criminal nature.
I also examined the size of the panel for each appeal that
resulted in the publication of a solo dissent. The Supreme Court of
Canada can hear appeals in panels of five, seven, or nine judges, and the
chief justice is responsible for determining both the size of the panel and
the assignment of judges to each panel. As a general rule, the Court has
undertaken to assign larger panels to the more important cases. Due to
the difficult legal issues dealt with by the Court as a whole, I considered
the possibility that the practice of solo dissent was on the rise due to a
relative increase in the number of cases heard by nine-judge panels.

24 Public law for the purposes of my research is defined as "non-criminal litigation to which

government officials, departments or boards are parties in their governmental capacity" (See Peter
McCormick, Canada'sCourts(Toronto: Lorimer, 1994) at 199.
2

'See ibid.at 81-82.
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Table 8: Comparison of Panel Size for Appeals Resulting in Solo Dissents
Court

Sample

5-Judge Panel

7-Judge Panel

9-Judge Panel

59.5%
33.3%

8
10

19.1%
55.6%

9
2

22.6%
20.0%
35.3%

26
9
53

49.1%
45.0%
39.9%

15
7
33

[

42
18

25
6

Lamer
McLachlin
Total
1

53
20.
133

12
4
47

Lasldn
Dickson

1

21.4%
11.1%

28.3%

1 35.0%
24.8%

Table 8 shows that an increasing number of solo dissents have
resulted from 'appeals in instances where all nine judges have sat
together. Currently, one out of every three solo dissents (35 per cent) on
the McLachlin Court originates from a nine-judge panel. While it
appears to be the case that judges may be inclined to produce a solo
dissent on more important issues of law (both seven- and nine-judge
panels have increased), the en banc appeals present a more important
scenario.
If an appeal to the Court is defeated by a four-to-three vote on a
seven-judge panel, the unsuccessful party will likely wonder whether a
different panel would have produced a more favourable result. If the
two judges had been present, would the appeal have resulted in a fiveto-four split in favour of the unsuccessful party? For example, we will
assume the Court is made up of nine judges-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H,
and I-and that on cases involving issue X, judges A, B, C, and D
comprise one voting bloc, and judges E, F, G, H, and I form a second
bloc. If judges F, G, H, and I were not part of the five-judge panel that
heard the appeal on issue X, then it is likely that judge E would write a
solo dissent in this particular instance. If a panel including more judges
from judge E's voting bloc was selected, E would likely be less inclined
to produce a solo dissent. Although panel size, as illustrated by this
example, may be a factor in the tendency of judges to author solo
opinions for five-judge and seven-judge panels, it is not the case for
nine-judge panels.
A judge who writes a solo opinion in an en banc appeal is not
advising his or her colleagues that they "got it wrong"; the dissenter is
claiming that the entire Court is misguided. When judges on the Court
take this step, what form of solo dissent follows?
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Table 9: Categories of Solo Dissent for Nine-Judge Panels
Court
Laskin

I Sample

Adoptive

Limited

Free-Standing

i

Dickson

9
2

2
0

22.2%
0.0%

4
2

44.4%
100.0%

3
0

Lamer
McLachlin 1
Total

15
7
33

1
1
4

6.7%
14.3%
12.2%

11
4
21

73.3%
57.1%
63.6%

3
2
8

1

33.3%
0.0%

j

20.0%
28.6%
24.2%

Due to heightened collegial implications of nine-judge panel
solo dissents, I expected to find a higher than average number of freestanding dissents, and very few adoptive dissents. Surprisingly, as
illustrated in Table 9, above, only one quarter (24.2 per cent) of the
nine-judge panel solo dissents were free-standing dissents, while over 12
per cent were adoptive dissents. Limited dissents, on the other hand,
were the most common type of dissent (63.6 per cent). These results
prompted a look at the categorization of the types of solo dissent of the
five- and seven-judge panels. Interestingly, almost half of the five-judge
panel solo dissents (46.8 per cent), and over a third of the seven-judge
panel solo dissents (37.7 per cent), constituted free-standing dissents.
These results demonstrate that panel sizes do not play a role in the
emerging patterns of solo dissent; judges do not necessarily provide
more extensive reasons when they conclude that each and every one of
their colleagues erred in their reasoning.
Another factor explored during this research was whether or not
solo dissent came with "softened edges. 2 6 Did the lone dissenter
include expressions of respect such as "with the greatest respect," "in
respectful disagreement," or "with all respect and after much
consideration"? Or was the lone dissenter unapologetic? While it was
most common for the expression of respect to be stated in the first few
paragraphs of the solo dissent, there were occasions when such
sentiments were inserted mid-way through the solo reasons. Also, some
judges explicitly directed their respect towards the majority author ("my
colleague"), whereas other solo writers extended more general forms of
respect ("with all due respect for those who disagree"). Examination of
the use of expressions of respect resulted in a number of interesting
trends.
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McCormick, supra note 1 at 100.

[VOL. 44, NO. 3

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Table 10: Incidence of Solo Dissents with Terms of Respect

Laskin
Dickson

Lamer
McLachlin
Total

Respect Terms

Sample

Court

J

42
18

19
8

53

21

20
133

5
53

j

I

45.2%
44.4%

39.6%

I

25.0%
39.8%

First, the use of respectful terms has decreased significantly over
the last three decades. Under the chief justiceships of Laskin and
Dickson, judges extended expressions of respect in almost half of the
solo dissents (45.2 per cent). While this number decreased only slightly
under Chief Justice Lamer (39.6 per cent), it has since dramatically
decreased. Currently, judges include expressions of respect only 25 per
cent of the time when writing solo dissents. Accordingly, not only are
judges writing solo dissents more frequently, but they are doing so
increasingly without apology.
Second, there appears to be no pattern as to when terms of
respect will be included in a solo dissenting opinion. Respectful terms
were employed in all the categories of dissent. While judges employed
respectful terms most often in instances of limited dissent (59 per cent),
they also did so in free-standing and adoptive dissents, 28 and 14 per
cent of the time, respectively. I also explored whether or not judges were
more likely to extend respect if the chief justice authored the majority
reasons. Of the 133 cases analyzed, 23 included majority reasons written
by a chief justice, and, of those, ten (43.5 per cent) included expressions
of respect. While the rate of respect shown for chief justice opinions was
slightly higher than average (3.7 per cent), the. difference is not great
enough to signal a convincing relationship.
Finally, there is no apparent pattern of respect among the
individual judges themselves. Almost all of the justices included
expressions of respect sporadically. Except for Chief Justice Lamer, who
never included a single pronouncement of respect in his solo opinions,
Supreme Court judges extend terms of respect inconsistently.
The last factor to be examined for the Court as a whole is the
role of the lower courts. I examined the following two characteristics of
each appeal: (1) the unity or fragmentation of the appeal panel; and (2)
whether or not the appeal was upheld or reversed, first by the respective
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court of appeal and, second, by the Court. Because provincial courts of
appeal almost exclusively operate with panels of three judges,2 7 I
categorized each appeal in one of the three following ways: a unanimous
panel signifying that all three judges agreed to a Single set of reasons; a
majority panel indicating that two judges signed on to a set of reasons
and a third judge wrote either a dissent or a separate concurrence; and a
panel representing a situation where all three judges wrote their own
opinions. Because the minority reasons on majority panels and the
panels where all three judges wrote their own opinions indicate a degree
of uncertainty and provide a "benchmark against which the majority's
reasoning can continue to be evaluated,"2 I expected a higher number
of solo dissents for these two categories.
As Table 11 shows, below, a large number of solo dissents were
in fact written in response to appeals that came from unanimous panels
(41.4 per cent), whereas less than half of the solo dissent caseload (47.3
per cent) came from either of the other panels.
Table 11: Composition of Court of Appeal Panels
Court of Appeal Reasons

Number of Cases

Percentage

Unanimous

55

41.4%

Majority

47

35.3%

Individual
Other*
Total

16
15
133

12.0%
11.3%
100.0%

not applicable or not recorded

The "other" category listed in Table 11, above, accounts for the
appeals that either were not applicable or not recorded. Cases were
deemed to be not applicable if there was no court of appeal ruling, for
example, in a motion for stay or a reference question from a court of
appeal. In one instance, the Court was reconsidering its own decision of
refusing to grant leave to appeal.29 In addition to the seven nonapplicable instances, eight of the 133 appeals resulted from rulings at
the court of appeal level that were not recorded.
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See McCormick, supra note 24.

2

William J. Brennan, "In Defense of Dissents" (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 427 at 435.

'R.

v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597.
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But the distribution of the appeal panel composition does not
tell the whole lower-court story; whether or not the appeal was reversed
by the Court is another part of the tale. According to Peterson, intercourt relations play a significant role in the patterns of dissent in
American courts." For example, when U.S. courts of appeal overrule
district court decisions, "there is a greater likelihood of dissent."3 Yet,
according to McCormick, this is not the case in Canada. He explains
that "dissent in the provincial appeal court ...is not connected with
higher rates of dissent in the higher court."32 While this may be true for
overall rates of dissent in the Supreme Court of Canada, I expected to
find a somewhat different trend for an outlier. Due to heightened
collegial implications, I anticipated that a single judge would be more
likely to disagree with his or her colleagues in instances where the Court
has overturned a unanimous (or even a majority) appeal decision'.
Table 12: Comparison of Supreme Court Rulings and Appeal Compositions
SCC Ruling

Majority

Unanimous

Upheld

26

47.3%

26

Overturned

29

52.7%

21

Total

55

100.0%

47

j

j

Each Judge Writes
SOwn Opinion

55.3%

6

44.7%

10

1100.0%

16

37.5%
62.5%

I

100.0%

This expectation is not supported by the results. Solo dissents
were written only slightly more often (5.4 per cent) when the Court
overturned a unanimous court of appeal decision. Moreover, judges
offered solo dissents more than half of the time (55.3 per cent) when the
Court upheld a majority panel. Thus, almost 40 per cent of the time
Supreme Court justices prepared solo dissents reflecting their belief that
most or all of the judges on the court of appeal and every one of their
distinguished colleagues were mistaken.
I was also prompted by the literature to consider what happens
at the trial level. According to McCormick, if a court of appeal has
threatened the continuity and solidarity of the judiciary by reversing the
decision of the trial judge, the Supreme Court is likely to reverse the

3

Steven A. Peterson, "Dissent in American Courts" (1981) 43 J. Pol. 412.
Ibid at 418.
32 Peter McCormick, "The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: Analysis of
Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990" (1992) 3 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1 at 17.
31
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court of appeal's decision in favour of the ruling at trial.33 Consequently,
if the Supreme Court is more likely to affirm the trial judge's decision, I
would expect to find a larger number of solo dissents where the
Supreme Court overturned the initial trial decision.
Table 13: Results of Trial Decisions to SCC Resulting in Solo Dissents
SCC Ruling

Number of Cases

Percentage

Upheld Trial Decision

62

46.6%

Overturned Trial Decision

70

52.6%

Other*

1

Total
133
* Reference case from the Supreme Court of Canada

0.8%
100.0%

As Table 13 indicates, although solo dissents are more likely to
occur where the Supreme Court has not supported the trial decision, the
numbers are not as high as expected. In practice, judges are only 6 per
cent more likely to write a solo dissent in these cases.
As a final note in examining the results of lower court decisions,
I examined the combined results of the trial and appeal reversals. Of the
133 instances of solo dissent, 39 (29 per cent) resulted when both the
trial and appeal judgments were reversed by the Supreme Court. Hence,
almost a third of the time, the lone dissenter is writing in favour of
concurrent decisions below. On the other hand, 39 of the 133 solo
dissents were written when the Court had upheld both the trial and
appeal decisions. This number was a great deal higher than I had
predicted. It is important to note that some judges wrote dissents in this
context more frequently than other contexts. For example, five of Chief
Justice Laskin's seven, three of Justice Sopinka's four, and two of Justice
McIntyre's three solo dissents involved challenging the judgments of
both courts below.
B.

Results: Looking at the IndividualJustices

This part focuses on the practice of solo dissent by individual
judges. In the period under study, a judge on the Supreme Court of
Canada typically dissented alone only four times during his or her entire

33 Ibid.

[VOL. 44, NO. 3

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

career.3 4 But many judges engage in the practice more frequently, some
much less frequently, and some not at all.
Table 14: Frequency of Solo Dissenting Judges, 1974-2003

L'Heureux-Dubd
Ritchie
Estey
Laskin
Lamer
Major
Wilson
Bastarache
Arbour

Martland
Spence
La Forest
Sopinka
McLachlin
LeBel

32'
9
I 8
7
7
7
6
6
6
___

__

Never

Less than Average

Average

More than Average

4
4
4
1 4
4
4

1

Judson
Dickson
McIntyre
Cory'
de Grandpr6
Stevenson
lacobucci
Pigeon
Gonthier
Desehamps

I
I

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Hall
Beetz
Pratte
Chouinard
Le Dain
Binnie
Fish

3
3
3
3
2
2
2

_

_

_

While the data in Table 14, above, provide some indication of
which judges authored more solo dissents, it does not consider the
length of time each judge has served on the Court. For example, Justices
Gonthier and Deschamps have each written one solo dissent; however,
Justice Gonthier's career on the Court spanned fifteen years, while
Justice Deschamps had only served on the Court for two years at the
time these data were collected. In order to make the frequency of
dissenting more comparable between individual judges, I calculated a
rate of solo dissent for each judge as shown in Table 15, below.36
The average rate of solo dissent for a judge on the modern
Supreme Court is 0.68 per cent; that is, one solo dissent for every 147
' 4See

Table 14 and the explanation following.
' Because Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 accounts for almost 25 per cent of the solo dissents
that I examined, I felt it necessary to run the research data without Justice L'Heureux-Dubd in
order to determine whether or not the results were still significant. All relationships and trends
remained significant, with some relationships even strengthened with the solo dissents of Justice
data.
L'Heureux-Dub6 excluded from the
6 By dividing the number of solo dissents by the number of appeals each judge has heard
during the 1974-2003 period, and then multiplying by 100 to obtain a percentage, a rate of solo
dissent (as a percentage of their total caseload) for each justice can be calculated. For example,
Justice Sopinka heard a total of 887 appeals throughout his entire career as a Supreme Court
justice, and authored four solo dissents during such time. Therefore Justice Sopinka's solo dissent
rate is 0.45 per cent (4 divided by 887, then multiplied by 100). Using the solo dissenting rate for
each judge, I was able to make a number of comparisons.
For evaluation purposes I ignored any judges that were on the Supreme Court prior to
Laskin's appointment as chief justice (because I am concerned with the "modern" Supreme Court).
I also ignored judges who had served less than two years on the Court. I chose the two-year cut-off
point because most judges do not dissent during the first year (but more than 85 per cent of the
judges had written at least one by the end of their second year).
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appeals. While the practice of solo dissent is not common for Supreme
Court judges, the fact that it happens at all makes it an important and
interesting phenomenon.
Table 15: Rate of Solo Dissent for Each Judge, 1974-2003
More than Average
L'Heureux-Dub6
Stevenson
Arbour
LeBel
Deschamps
Bastarache
Ritchie
Estey
Wilson
Laskin

[2.64
2.17
2.13
1.65
1.51
1.39
1.11
1.09
1.07
1.05

Less than Average

Average
Judson
Spence
Major
de Grandpre
Lamer
Martland

10.85
1 0.85
1 0.81
0.63
0.61
0.59

I

Sopinka
McIntyre
La Forest
McLachlin
Cory
Dickson
lacobucci
Pigeon
Gonthier

Never

0.45
0.38
0.38
0.34
0.31
0.22
0.19
0.17
0.08

Hall
Beetz
Pratte
Chouinard
Le Dain
Binnie
Fish

_

_

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

_

Using the solo dissent rate for each judge I compared a number
of factors, hoping to find a pattern of solo dissenting among frequent
dissenters, average dissenters, and below-average dissenters. I
considered judges within a 25 per cent range of the average rate (0.68
per cent) to be average dissenters (0.51-0.85 per cent);37 judges with a
rate higher than 0.85 per cent to be frequent dissenters; and judges with
a rate of less than 0.51 per cent but greater than zero to be belowaverage dissenters. Under the premise that above-average dissenters
may feel less constrained by notions of collegiality, and, more
importantly, would experience a larger workload and therefore write
less lengthy legal arguments, I proceeded to examine the word length of
the dissents.
Table 16: Relationship Between Word Count and Frequency of Dissent
Solo Dissent Rate
Frequent
.
> 0.86%
Average
0.51-0.85%
Below Average
<
0.51%
* 3717 words = average length

Word Count

Compared To Average*

4935
1898
4078

+32.8%
-48.9%
+ 9.7%

of a solo dissent

As can be seen from Table 16, above, the data only partially
supports my expectations. While it is true that judges who dissent less
frequently write longer than average solo opinions (9.7 per cent longer),

370.25 x 0.68 = 0.17, 0.17 plus or minus 0.68 equals 0.86 and 0.51 respectively.
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it is also the case that frequent dissenters write longer than average
opinions. In fact, frequent dissenters tend to write outlier reasons that
are significantly longer (32.8 per cent). It is apparent from Table 16 that
the only judges writing shorter reasons are the average dissenters-their
reasons are significantly shorter at just below half the average length
(48.9 per cent).
In an attempt to understand the unexpected results, I compared
the frequency groups with the categories of dissent. Knowing that
frequent dissenters tended to write lengthier reasons, I anticipated a
greater percentage of this group's caseload would consist of freestanding and limited dissents. Following from this, I expected the
caseload of below-average dissenters to consist largely of limited
dissents, and the caseload of average dissenters to include mostly
adoptive dissents and a small number of limited dissents. Table 17,
below, presents the breakdown of the different forms of dissent for each
frequency group.
Table 17: Breakdown of the Types of Solo Dissents by Frequency Category
Average

Frequent

Types Of Solo Dissents

>

18.75%

4

10

62.50%

12

3
16

18.75%
100.0%

8
24

3

28

43.1%

27
65

41.5%
100.0%

10

Limited

Free-Standing
Total

<

0.5-0.85%

0.86%

1

15.4%

Adoptive

Below Average

1

0.5%

16.7%
i

50.0%

.3%

The data in Table 17 support the above expectations to some
degree. The bulk of the caseload (84.6 per cent) for the frequent
dissenters is made up of free-standing and limited dissents, while limited
dissents account for half of the caseload for the below-average
dissenters. Surprisingly, the percentage of adoptive dissents for the
average frequency group was not much higher than that of the frequent
and below-average categories. Instead, the majority of the 'average
frequency caseload consisted of limited dissents (62.5 per cent).
What is interesting about the data in Tables 16 and 17 is that
they create a somewhat paradoxical relationship. Focusing on the
implication of dissent for collegiality within the Court, one might expect
that judges who dissent the least often would do so in a more "serious"
manner. But this is not the case. Judges with higher solo dissent rates
actually write opinions that are longer and arguably of a more significant
nature than judges who dissent an average or less than average amount.

Solo Dissents
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A look at the general dissenting practices of the judges of the Supreme
Court may help shed some light on this paradoxical relationship.
Table 18: Comparison of Frequency of Solo Dissents and Minority Reasons
Solo Dissent Rate

Minority Opinion Rate

Solo / Minority

Dickson
Beetz
de Grandpr6

0.22%
0.00%
0.63%

5.5%
3.2%
10.7%

4.0%
0.0%
5.9%

Estey
Mcintyre
Chouinard
Lamer

1.09%

5.3%

20.6%

0.38%

5.1%

7.5%

0.00%
0.61%

1.0%
9.1%

0.0%
6.7%

Wilson
Le Dain
La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub
Sopinka

1.07%
0.00%
0.38%
2.64%
0.45%

17.3%
5.6%
10.8%
18.1%
11.8%

6.2%
0.0%
3.5%
14.6%
3.8%

Gonthier
Gory
McLachlin
Iacobucci
Major
Bastarache
Binnie
Arbour

0.08%
0.31%

4.5%
5.8%

1.8%
5.3%

0.34%
0.19%
0.81%
1.39%
0.00%
2.13%

11.9%
4.4%
6.2%
7.4%
4.7%
7.1%

2.9%
4.3%
13.1%
18.8%
0.0%
30.0%

LeBel

1.65%

10.7%

15.4%

The first column in Table 18 lists the rate of solo dissent for each
judge. The second column shows the rate at which each judge wrote
minority reasons. The "rate of minority reasons" indicates the number
of times a judge wrote minority reasons as a percentage of the number
of appeals each heard from 1974 to 2003,38 indicating the frequency that
each judge authored either a dissent or a separate concurrence.
Therefore, the rate of minority reasons does not indicate the
disagreement rate (because it does not include the instances when the
judge joined another judge's minority reasons), but rather indicates the
written disagreement rate. The average written disagreement rate for
the modern Supreme Court is 7.9 per cent. The third column shows the
relationship between the rate of solo dissent and the rate of minority
reasons for each judge.

38 Percentage rate of minority reasons = (# of minority opinions authored - total # of

appeals heard) x 100.
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As illustrated by Table 18, above, a number of judges, when
writing minority reasons, tend to write solo dissents. On average, one
out of every thirteen written minority opinions is a solo dissent (7.8 per
cent). Some judges write solo dissents more frequently than this, yet
their rate of minority reasons is below average (less than 7.9 per cent).
Justices Estey, Bastarache, and Arbour have above-average solo dissent
rates, yet their rate of written disagreement is below average, making
these judges more likely than other judges to author solo dissents. In the
third column on Table 18, the percentages for Justices Estey,
Bastarache, and Arbour are well above average; instead of writing one
solo dissent for every thirteen minority opinions, Justices Estey and
Bastarache wrote one for every five and Justice Arbour wrote one for
every three.
On the other hand, there are a handful of judges who show the
opposite tendency. Although Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices
LaForest and Sopinka have below average solo dissent rates, they write
minority reasons more often than average. Therefore, they are more
likely to write minority reasons when they are not alone on the issue.
Justices LaForest and Sopinka wrote one solo dissent for every 27
minority opinions and Chief Justice McLachlin wrote one out of every
35. One could argue that norms of consensus are playing a role in the
writing of solo dissents for certain judges. Because frequent solo
dissenters tend to have lower written rates of disagreement, perhaps
these judges consider challenging their colleagues to be a serious
undertaking, and, as a result, are compelled to write lengthier and more
substantial forms of dissent.
Finally, I explored the effects of prior judicial and academic
experience on solo dissent rates. A recent study by Russell Smyth
suggests that judges with at least five years of judicial experience prior to
being appointed to the High Court of Australia exhibit higher rates of
dissent. 39 Logically, this relationship is somewhat ambiguous. On the
one hand, it can be argued that judges with prior judicial experience
recognize the need for stability and self-restraint in judicial decision
making and overcompensate by "rigid adherence to what they see as an
important institutional norm."4 On the other hand, "prior judicial
9

See Russell Smyth, "Explaining Historical Dissent Rates in the High Court of Australia"
(2003) Commonwealth & Comp. Pol. 83.
40 Ibid. at 94.
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experience provides a degree of psychic security," thereby allowing
judges with previous experience to exercise greater confidence while
deviating from consensual norms.
According to Table 19, below, judges with more than five years
of previous judicial experience prior to being appointed to the Supreme
Court of Canada exhibit higher rates of solo dissent.
Table 19: Comparison of Prior Judicial Experience and Solo Dissent Rates
Prior
Experience
> 5years
< 5 years

Solo
Judicia
aDiet
Rate
0.86%
0.49%

Compared
(.
(0.68%)
+26.5%

Mino
Opinn R
Opinion Rait
8.3%

-38.8%

6.6%

1

Compared
to Average

Solo Rate as a
Percentage of

+ 5.1%

8.6%

-16.5%

7.0%

i

Compared
to Average
(7.8%)
+10.3%
10.3%

Judges with at least five years of experience have a dissent rate
that is 26.5 per cent higher than the average rate, and 75.5 per -cent
higher than the rate of judges with less than five years of prior judicial
experience. Judges with five years or more of prior experience are also
25.8 per cent more likely to write minority reasons than judges with less
experience, and 22.9 per cent more likely to write solo dissents when
writing minority reasons. Supreme Court judges with at least five years
of prior judicial experience may be more confident in deviating from
consensual norms, and more likely to disagree with their distinguished
colleagues.
Does the same tendency result from prior academic
experience-that is, are judges with prior academic experience any more
likely to write solo dissents than their non-academic colleagues?
Literature suggests that academic judges are more likely to cite dissents
and separate concurrences as legal authorities than non-academic
judges. 4' Academics "are often looking for interesting perspectives or
penetrating insights and ...[i]n such pursuit are willing to use a pretty
fine net and to cast it very wide., 4 2 Consequently, one might expect the
academic "net" to catch a number of solo dissents.
For the purposes of this research, judges who had either taught
at a university for a number of years, published one or more major
works of law, or were known for regularly publishing academic articles

4 See Peter McCormick, "Second Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents &
Separate Concurrences, 1949-1999" (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 369.
42

Ibid.at 381.

524

[VOL. 44, NO.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

3

were considered academics. The data in Table 20 reveal that academic
judges do write solo dissents more frequently than non-academic judges,
at a rate 7.4 per cent higher than average, and 12.3 per cent higher than
non-academic judges.
Table 20: Comparison of Prior Academic Experience and Solo Dissent Rates
Prior
Academic

Experience
YES
NO

Solo
Dissent
Rate
0.73%
0.65%

Compared
to Average
(0.68%)

Minority
Opinion Rate

+7.4%
-4.4%

8.1%
7.8%

Compared
to Average
(7.9%)
+2.5%
- 1.3%

Solo Rate as a
Percentage of
Minority
8.7%
7.1%

Compared
to Average
(7.8%)
+ 11.5%
- 9.0%

Interestingly, academic judges write minority reasons at a rate
only slightly higher than non-academics, but are more likely to write a
solo opinion when they do undertake the task of writing a minority
opinion. It appears that while judges with prior academic experience
write minority reasons at almost the same rate as judges with nonacademic experience, they are more likely to write solo opinions in
pursuit of "interesting perspectives and penetrating insights."
C.

Results: Recent Supreme Court Solo Dissents

The final stage of my analysis entailed taking a closer look at the
recent practices of Supreme Court judges.43 What conclusions, if any,
can be drawn about the future of solo dissent in the McLachlin era?
Table 21: Current Supreme Court of Canada
Solo Dissent Rate
Current SCC
Average
Difference

Solo Rate
as a
Minority Opinion Rate Percentage
of Minority

0.89
0.68

7.2
7.9

10.8
7.8

+30.9%

- 8.9%

+38.5%

A number of assumptions can be made from Table 21. From
2000 to 2003, the Supreme Court's solo dissent rate was 30.9 per cent
higher than average, and this increased incidence of solo dissent is not
just part of a larger trend of more frequent disagreement. From the
second column, it is apparent that recently the Court has written
minority reasons at a rate that is almost 10 per cent less than average.

43

This part draws on data analyzed for the period from January 2000 to December 2003.
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This indicates that judges are writing minority reasons less often, but
when doing so are more likely to be dissenting alone.
There are a number of reasons that might explain the increase in
the frequency of solo dissent on the Court. First, five of the nine current
Supreme Court judges have more than five years of prior judicial
experience. Another possible reason is that six of the nine judges have
an academic background. It is interesting to point out that the judges of
the current Court have a solo dissent rate as a percentage of minority
reasons that is 23 per cent higher than the average academic rate for the
entire modern Supreme Court era (see Table 20 in Part II(B), above).
Based on the trends identified in this study, one could argue that
the solo dissent rate of the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to
continue to climb. However, because of the constant cycle of judges
leaving and joining the Court, it is difficult to predict with certainty
where it might go from here."
III.

SOLO DISSENT AND THE LAW AS A "LIVING TREE"

This research examined the statistical side of judicial
disagreement. Although it has shed some light on a special form of
disagreement that was shrouded in darkness, solo dissent still remains
somewhat of a mystery. While a number of factors may account for the
patterns of solo dissent within the Supreme Court, and while a typology
may assist in the understanding of the various forms and contents of
solo dissents, understanding why particular judges write solo dissents is a
daunting task. Nonetheless, solo dissent is an important part of judicial
decision making that offers many avenues for further study.
Solo dissents are a reminder that the law is a "living tree" which
has grown roots that touch upon deeply embedded moral and political
values within the ground of judicial decision making. Judges are
increasingly willing to relax the norms of consensus and to shift the
institutional scale in favour of individualistic tendencies. This does not
undermine the Supreme Court of Canada as a collegial body; rather, it
recognizes that there are times when the opinion of the Court embodies
"all but one."

4 Both Justices Arbour and Iacobucci have left the Supreme Court. Interestingly, Justice
Arbour has the highest solo dissent rate on the current Court (2.13 per cent) and Justice Iacobucci
exhibits the lowest rate (0.19 per cent).

